Justia West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioners Robert and Rickie Bansbach sought injunctive relief in connection with allegations that their neighbors, Respondents Daniel Harbin and Mary Fanok, were engaging in conduct which constituted both a nuisance and harassment. The trial court ruled that Petitioners had failed to demonstrate that Respondents' conduct constituted a private nuisance or that Respondents' speech, both verbal and written, was unlawful. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in ruling (1) Respondents' storing of materials on the Fanok property did not create a nuisance that must be abated by the Court; (2) Respondents' posting of signs and shouting profanities at Petitioners did not amount to fighting words for First Amendment purposes; and (3) Respondents' behavior was not so outrageous that it required injunctive relief. View "Bansbach v. Harbin" on Justia Law

Petitioner David Griffy pleaded guilty to two counts of grand larceny and was sentenced to two indeterminate one-to-ten year terms of imprisonment. Griffy subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration of sentence and a motion to withdraw plea. The circuit court denied the motions. Griffy appealed, asserting that the circuit court committed reversible error by failing to comply with W.Va. R. Crim. P. 11(e)(2). The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) it was evident that Griffy did not understand when he pled guilty that he would not be allowed to later withdraw his plea if his sentence did not meet his expectations, and there was no evidence that Griffy was ever given a Rule 11(2)(e) warning; and (2) the substantial rights of Griffy were affected by the circuit court's failure to give the Rule 11(e)(2) warning. Remanded with instructions that Griffy be given an opportunity to either plead anew or to grant specific performance so that the sentence comported with the reasonable understanding and expectations of Griffy as to the sentence for which he bargained. View "State v. Griffy" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Petitioner Samuel Scarbro was convicted in the circuit court of the felony offense of fraudulent use of a bank conveyance or access device. At issue on appeal was whether the circuit court erred in excluding from the evidence at trial a prior inconsistent statement of the State's key witness. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the witness's pre-trial statement should have been admitted at Petitioner's trial, and the circuit court's refusal to do so constituted error; and (2) the error in excluding the evidence was not harmless, as the improper exclusion of the witness's prior inconsistent statement placed the fairness of Petitioner's trial in doubt. Remanded for a new trial. View "State v. Scarbro" on Justia Law

Respondent Christopher Toler's driver's license was revoked by the Commissioner of the Division of Motor Vehicles after Respondent's vehicle was stopped at a vehicle equipment checkpoint and Respondent was arrested for driving under the influence. The circuit court reversed, concluding (1) Respondent was driving while under the influence of alcohol; but (2) the vehicle equipment checkpoint at which Respondent was stopped was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the judicially-created exclusionary rule is not applicable in a civil, administrative driver's license revocation or suspension proceeding; and (2) therefore, the circuit court erred in applying the exclusionary rule to exclude all evidence in this case. Remanded. View "Miller v. Toler" on Justia Law

Petitioner Tony Myers was convicted of three counts of first degree robbery and was sentenced to three concurrent terms of incarceration of sixty years each. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err by (1) allowing the admission of evidence obtained pursuant to a warrantless arrest, search, and seizure; (2) permitting witnesses called by the State to identify Petitioner despite being subjected to a prior identification procedure; (3) charging, trying, and convicting Petitioner of three counts of robbery; and (3) denying Defendant's motions for judgment of acquittal or a new trial based upon the insufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions. View "State v. Myers" on Justia Law

In the underlying action in this case, Respondent Michael Brown was convicted of murder in the first degree and sentenced to two consecutive terms of life imprisonment. Respondent filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, and the circuit court set aside the convictions and granted Respondent a new trial. The basis of the circuit court's ruling was that a juror in the criminal trial failed to answer certain questions during voir dire. The court concluded that in light of the Supreme Court's recent decision in State v. Dellinger, the juror's lack of candor deprived the circuit court and the parties of the ability to determine the juror's fitness to serve, which foreclosed Respondent's constitutional right to a fair trial. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, based on the relevant statutory and case law and the material from the habeas corpus proceedings and the criminal trial, the circuit court committed reversible error in granting Respondent a new trial. Remanded. View "Coleman v. Brown " on Justia Law

Karen Tanner appealed an order the circuit court that granted her parole with the condition that she not be in the presence or accompaniment of anyone convicted of a felony, including her husband. Tanner contended (1) the circuit court was without authority to grant parole insofar as parole is an executive function, and (2) the condition that she not associate with her husband was an unreasonable burden on her right of marriage. After discussing the reasons for imposing parole conditions, including the aim of reducing recidivism, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the West Virginia Home Incarceration Act imparts authority to circuit courts to grant parole under the conditions specified therein; and (2) the circuit court properly exercised its discretion and did not act in an unreasonable, capricious, or arbitrary manner when it imposed upon Tanner's parole the condition that she not associate with her husband. View "State v. Tanner" on Justia Law

Tyrone Crouch was convicted by a jury of voluntary manslaughter and sentenced by the circuit court to ten years imprisonment. Crouch appealed, contending that the circuit court improperly instructed the jury on the lesser-included offense of involuntary manslaughter. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) because of the clearly inconsistent and confusing definition of involuntary manslaughter given by the trial court, it was not certain that the jury understood how they could reach a verdict on that lesser included offense; and (2) the Court was unable to determine independently from the record that the inconsistent instructions were harmless. Remanded for a new trial. View "State v. Crouch" on Justia Law

The West Virginia Office of Tax Appeals rejected the challenge of ConAgra Brands, Inc. to assessments for unpaid corporation net income tax and business franchise tax. The assessments were imposed on apportioned royalties ConAgra received from the licensing of its intangible trademarks and trade names for use through the United States, including West Virginia. In setting aside the decision of the Office of Tax Appeals, the circuit court held that ConAgra's licensing transactions did not constitute doing business in West Virginia and that the assessments failed to meet the requirements of the due process and commerce clauses of the U.S. Constitution. The State Tax Commissioner sought reinstatement of the assessments for corporation net income tax and business franchise tax. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court, holding that the order setting aside the decision of the Office of Tax Appeals and invalidating the assessments should not be disturbed. View "Griffith v. Conagra Brands, Inc." on Justia Law

Michael Chenoweth was arrested for driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. Thereafter, Commissioner Joe Miller of the West Virginia Division of Motor Vehicles issued an order revoking Chenoweth's privilege to drive a motor vehicle. The circuit court reversed and vacated the revocation of Chenoweth's driver's license based on its finding that the trooper improperly stopped Chenoweth's vehicle without an articulable reasonable suspicion. In so doing, the circuit court applied the exclusionary rule to an administrative driver's license revocation proceeding. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that there was no illegal stop, and thus it was not necessary to reach the issue of whether the circuit court properly applied the exclusionary rule in this case. View "Miller v. Chenoweth" on Justia Law