Justia West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, a registered professional nurse, was terminated from her employment when her employer concluded that Petitioner had unlawfully obtained prescription narcotics for personal use or distribution to others. In 2008, Petitioner's employer filed a complaint against Petitioner in that regard with the Board of Examiners for Registered Professional Nurses. Petitioner was subsequently hired at another medical center, and her employment was terminated. In 2009, Petitioner's second employer filed a complaint with the Board, suggesting that Petitioner had unlawfully obtained prescription narcotics for personal use or distribution to others. In 2012, Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of prohibition asking the Supreme Court to direct the Board to dismiss the 2008 and 2009 complaints, alleging that the Board's continuances of the administrative hearings scheduled to resolve the two complaints were contrary to law, had deprived Petitioner of substantial resources, and had improperly delayed the entry of a final administrative decision. The Supreme Court granted the writ and dismissed the two complaints, holding that the Board effectively denied Petitioner an opportunity to be heard in opposition to the allegations against her. View "State ex rel. Fillinger v. Rhodes" on Justia Law

Respondents were former employees of Verizon West Virginia, Inc. who filed wrongful termination claims against Verizon based upon alleged violations of the West Virginia Human Rights Act. Petitioners were Verizon and various of its managerial and similar-positioned employees (collectively, Verizon) who were named as defendants in the underlying wrongful termination proceedings. At issue before the Supreme Court was Verizon's contention that Respondents' counsel's (Law Firm) prior representation of other former employees of Verizon in substantially related matters that were settled and dismissed required Law Firm to be disqualified. The circuit court permitted Law Firm to continue its representation of Respondents. Verizon subsequently requested the issuance of a writ of prohibition disqualifying Law Firm. The Supreme Court denied the writ, finding that Verizon was not entitled to prohibitory relief because (1) Law Firm's successive representation of its former and current clients did not constitute a conflict under the West Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct; and (2) moreover, the relief requested by Verizon would impermissibly restrict Law Firm's right to practice law in contravention of the Rules of Professional Conduct. View "State ex rel. Verizon West Virginia, Inc. v. Circuit Court" on Justia Law

The underlying litigation in this case involved the Legislature's enactment of "Special Acts" for nine county boards of education requiring them to divert a portion of their regular levy receipts in support of their local libraries. The Kanawha County Board of Education (BOE) originally brought suit in circuit court, alleging that one such Act's requirement that the BOE contribute to the funding of the Kanawha County Public Library violated equal protection. The Supreme Court agreed and found the statute unconstitutional. In response, the Legislature amended the statute. The County BOE then filed the instant action, arguing that the statute as amended violated equal protection. The circuit court invalidated as unconstitutional the Special Act to the extent it required the BOE to divert a portion of its regular levy receipts in support of the Library or transfer the funding obligation to its excess levy, and enjoined the Library and the West Virginia BOE from enforcing the Special Act as it pertained to the County BOE's library funding obligation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Act, to the extent it obligated the County BOE to divert a portion of its regular or excess levy receipts to the Library, was unconstitutional and unenforceable. View "Kanawha County Pub. Library Bd. v. Bd. of Educ. of County of Kanawha" on Justia Law

Petitioner pleaded guilty to sexual abuse by a person in a position of trust and third degree sexual assault. Due to Petitioner's health concerns, the trial court permitted Petitioner to serve his sentences by the alternate means of electronically-monitored home incarceration. Petitioner subsequently sought habeas corpus relief for sentencing and post-sentencing matters. The trial court modified the terms of Petitioner's home incarceration to afford Petitioner, among other things, one hour per day of recreational time outside the physical confines of his house and to permit travel outside the state for necessary medical appointments. Petitioner appealed, seeking immediate release from any further incarceration in light of his continuing deterioration due to Parkinson's disease. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was no basis for habeas corpus relief or for further modification of the terms of Petitioner's sentencing. View "Elder v. Scolapia" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of ten counts of sexual abuse by a guardian. Defendant subsequently filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The circuit found that Defendant's indictment conflicted with constitutional due process requirements by failing to apprise Defendant of the charges against him for purposes of preparing a defense and that the indictment exposed Defendant to double jeopardy based on the possibility that the same evidence would be used to convict him on multiple, identical counts. The circuit court ordered that Defendant's conviction and sentence on nine of the ten counts be vacated and set aside. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Defendant was not denied due process because he was provided with adequate notice of the charges against him; and (2) Defendant was not convicted in violation of double jeopardy principles. View "Ballard v. Dilworth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of robbery in the first degree and conspiracy to commit the felony offense of robbery in the first degree. Defendant appealed, contending that the circuit court committed reversible error by refusing to give the jury an instruction for misdemeanor assault and/or an instruction for battery as a lesser included offense to the charge of robbery in the first degree. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not commit error in refusing to give Defendant's requested instructions for assault and battery, as misdemeanor assault and battery are not lesser included offenses of first degree robbery. View "State v. Wilkerson" on Justia Law

In 2002, the circuit court entered an order finding Defendant not guilty of first degree arson by reason of mental illness. The court ordered Defendant to be committed to a mental health facility in West Virginia. The placement failed effectively to treat Defendant's mental illness, as did Defendant's placement in another West Virginia psychiatric hospital. The circuit court subsequently transferred Defendant to a South Carolina psychiatric hospital, determining that the placement was the best available treatment option for Defendant. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the order transferring Defendant to South Carolina did not violate the clause "no person shall be transported out of, or forced to leave the State for any offense committed within the same" contained in the West Virginia Constitution; (2) the circuit court did not err in concluding that Defendant's placement in the South Carolina facility was consistent with the statutory directive requiring Defendant to be placed in the "least restrictive environment" to manage his mental illness; and (3) the transfer was not in violation of the Interstate Compact on the Mentally Disordered. View "State v. Robertson" on Justia Law

In 2009, Defendant was convicted of robbery in the second degree and attempted robbery in the second degree. Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment for robbery in the second degree. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial, holding that the trial court erred in allowing the State to introduce evidence of Defendant's prior convictions for crimes committed in 2000 and in admitting evidence that Defendant was on parole when the instant crimes occurred, as (1) Defendant did not open the door for the introduction of the evidence; (2) the State failed to offer any relevant contention to refute the trial court's pretrial determination that Defendant's prior convictions were not admissible under W.Va. R. Evid. 404(b); (3) the State failed to prove that Defendant's prior convictions for wanton endangerment in 2000 were intrinsic to the charges of robbery and attempted robbery in 2009; (4) the marginal value of evidence of Defendant's parole status was far outweighed by its prejudicial impact; and (5) the improperly admitted evidence was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. View "State v. Baker" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Petitioner was found guilty of operating or attempting to operate a clandestine drug laboratory. Petitioner was sentenced to an indeterminate term of two to ten years and was later re-sentenced for appeal purposes. Petitioner appealed, arguing that the circuit court erred by admitting into evidence Petitioner's statement made two years after the events alleged in the indictment and by denying Petitioner's motion for judgment of acquittal. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not err in determining that Petitioner's statement was relevant to the charges against him and was not unduly prejudicial; and (2) sufficient evidence existed to sustain Petitioner's conviction of operating or attempting to operate a clandestine drug laboratory. View "State v. Hypes" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of burglary (against his father), battery of an elder person (against his father), and domestic assault (against his stepmother). All three convictions were the result of one trial and based upon the same criminal acts by Petitioner. In this appeal, Petitioner asserted that the circuit court erred by granting the State's motion to join a subsequently filed information (the domestic assault against Petitioner's stepmother) with a previously returned indictment (which included the burglary and battery charges against Petitioner's father) where the basis for joinder was that they arose out of a common nexus of fact. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court was correct in allowing consolidation of the indictment with the later filed information charge, as the State did not amend the indictment, nor was there any allegation that the original indictment was flawed in any way. View "State v. Hartman" on Justia Law