Justia West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The West Virginia Division of Motor Vehicles (DMV) revoked the driver’s licenses of Respondents following their arrests for driving under the influence of alcohol. The Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) reversed the revocation of Respondents’ driver’s licenses, concluding that the evidence did not establish that Respondents had been lawfully arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol. The circuit court denied the DMV’s petitions for judicial review. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for reinstatement of the respective DMV orders revoking Respondents’ driver’s licenses, holding that Respondents were lawfully arrested, and the OAH’s findings to the contrary were clearly wrong.View "Dale v. Odum" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first degree robbery and conspiracy and sentenced to serve fifty-two to sixty years in prison. Defendant appealed the denial of his motion to suppress. The Supreme Court issued a Memorandum Decision holding Defendant's appeal in abeyance to permit the circuit court to enter an order on the issues of whether the Drug Enforcement administration (DEA) properly issued an administrative subpoena to obtain Defendant's cellular phone records and whether the DEA properly released that information with members of the police department. On remand, the circuit court entered an amended order denying Defendant's motion to suppress. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's amended order denying Defendant's motion to suppress, holding (1) the police department acted improperly toward the DEA in obtaining Defendant's phone records; (2) Defendant had no constitutionally protected legitimate expectation of privacy in his phone records, and thus, the exclusionary rule did not apply in this case; and (3) Defendant did not have standing to question the validity of the subpoena in a state court proceeding.View "State v. Clark" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Petitioner was convicted of first degree murder. Petitioner appealed his conviction, but the Supreme Court refused the request to hear the appeal. Petitioner subsequently filed a request for habeas corpus relief, alleging that both his trial counsel and his appellate counsel were ineffective. The circuit court denied the requested habeas relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not err in finding that trial counsel effectively represented Petitioner; and (2) the circuit court did not err in denying habeas corpus relief on the ground of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. View "State ex rel. Adkins v. Dingus" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first degree murder and first degree arson involving a fire that killed his girlfriend. Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility for parole on the murder conviction. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence, holding, inter alia, that (1) no error was committed in the way the preliminary hearing was conducted; (2) the circuit court did not err in striking a witness' testimony; (3) the circuit court did not err in denying a mistrial after a witness' testimony was found to be incorrect; (4) the circuit court did not err in allowing into evidence Defendant's statements to law enforcement that were given without Miranda warnings; (4) the circuit court did not err in failing to dismiss the indictment because of spoliation of evidence; and (5) Petitioner's decision to testify on his on behalf was not coerced by the trial court.View "State v. Davis" on Justia Law

Petitioners in these two consolidated appeals were convicted of sexual-related offenses. Both Petitioners were sentenced pursuant to section W. Va. Code 62-12-26, which provides for extended supervision of certain sex offenders. In each case, the lower courts modified Petitioners' supervised release and imposed additional sanctions pursuant to section 62-12-26(g)(3). The primary issue in the appeals was the constitutionality of the portion of section 62-12-26 that permits the revocation of supervised release and additional incarceration when a sex offender violates a condition of supervised release. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts' orders in each case, holding (1) section 62-12-26(g)(3) does not violate constitutional principles of due process, equal protection, and double jeopardy; and (2) Petitioners' post-revocation sanctions were not constitutionally disproportionate to their underlying convictions. View "State v. Hargus" on Justia Law

Respondent was arrested for driving under the influence after his vehicle was stopped by a police officer responding to a telephone call and information obtained from an individual claiming she had observed the vehicle driving erratically. The Division of Motor Vehicles issued an order administratively revoking Respondent’s license. The Office of Administrative Hearings reversed Respondent’s license revocation, finding that there was insufficient evidence to prove that the officers had an articulable reasonable suspicion to initiate the traffic stop, and therefore the initial traffic stop was invalid and the resulting license revocation was improper. The circuit court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that both the initial stop and the arrest were valid. Remanded for an order reinstating Respondent’s administrative license revocation. View "Dale v. Ciccone" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Petitioner was found guilty of sexual abuse by a parent, guardian, custodian or person in a position of trust to a child and sentenced to twenty years in the penitentiary. Two years later, Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction habeas corpus relief, arguing that his former defense counsel was ineffective for failing to submit proper jury instructions on whether Petitioner was a “person in a position of trust” as to the victim and whether the victim was under Petitioner’s “care, custody, or control” at the time of the sexual encounter. The circuit court granted Petitioner’s petition. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the failure to offer the instructions did not constitute deficient performance by counsel. View "Ballard v. Thomas" on Justia Law

After a trial, Petitioner was convicted of one count of threatening to commit a terrorist act. Petitioner appealed the denial of his post-trial motions to dismiss or, alternatively, to acquit, arguing (1) the criminal offense set forth in W. Va. Code 61-6-24(b) is unconstitutionally vague, and (2) the evidence was insufficient to prove he committed the offense of threatening to commit a terrorist act. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) section 61-6-24(b) is free from constitutional defect; but (2) because the threat prosecuted by the State in this case was not aimed at a branch or level of government, but solely at an individual police officer, the evidence was insufficient to prove that Defendant committed the felony offense at issue. View "State v. Yocum" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of robbery in the first degree for entering a Wendy’s restaurant and attempting to obtain money by holding a machete against the throat of a restaurant employee. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s conviction and sentence of forty years in the penitentiary, holding (1) Defendant’s confession to the police was properly admitted at trial, as it was not given in violation of Defendant’s right to counsel, and the State proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the confession was voluntary; and (2) the employee’s in-court identification of Defendant was properly admitted at trial. View "State v. Blackburn" on Justia Law

Following allegations of sexual abuse and failure to protect, the Department of Health and Human Resources (DHHR) brought a child abuse and neglect proceeding against Father and Mother (Petitioners). After an adjudicatory hearing, the circuit court found that the children were abused and neglected, and, after a dispositional hearing, terminated the parental rights of Petitioners. Petitioners appealed, arguing that their procedural due process rights were violated when the out-of-court statements of two children were admitted to prove allegations of sexual abuse when Petitioners were not given an opportunity to confront and cross-examine the children. The Supreme Court affirmed the termination of Petitioners’ parental rights, holding (1) in a child abuse and neglect civil proceeding held pursuant to W. Va. Code 29-6-2, a party does not have a procedural due process right to confront and cross-examine a child, and the circuit court shall exclude this testimony if it finds the potential psychological harm to the child outweighs the necessity of the child’s testimony; and (2) the circuit court adequately safeguarded Petitioners’ procedural due process rights in this case. View "In re J.S." on Justia Law