Justia West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Elizabeth Shanton was indicted in a fifty-four count indictment connected to her use of a purchasing card (P-card) issued pursuant to West Virginia’s Purchasing Card Program. The circuit court dismissed fifty-three counts, each of which alleged that Shanton used the P-card in violation of W. Va. code 12-3-10b. The circuit court determined that the inclusion of these counts in the indictment violated principles of double jeopardy because (1) each swipe of the P-Card was part of a continuing offense, and therefore, Shanton could only be charged with one violation of section 12-3-10b; and (2) the elements of the crime described in the fifty-three dismissed counts overlapped completely with the elements of the remaining count. The State sought a writ of prohibition to prohibit the circuit court from enforcing its order dismissing the fifty-three counts. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the circuit court erred by (i) collapsing counts 2 through 54 into a single count, thereby effectively dismissing all but one of those counts, and (ii) dismissing the condensed count, thereby dismissing all counts in the indictment alleging violations of section 12-3-10b; and (2) the State was entitled to the writ it sought. View "State ex rel. Lorenzetti v. Hon. Sanders" on Justia Law

Prior to his termination, Petitioner was employed by Respondent, a tin plate manufacturer, as a technician operator. After his termination, Petitioner and his wife (Petitioners) filed this action seeking damages for retaliatory discharge and loss of consortium, alleging that Petitioner was discharged for reporting violations of a permit issued under the West Virginia Water Pollution Control Act (WPCA) and making complaints to Respondent about those permit violations. Respondents removed the case to federal court on grounds of diversity. The federal district court then certified a question to the West Virginia supreme Court, which answered the question as follows: An employee who alleges that he was discharged for reporting violations of a permit issued under authority of the WPCA and making complaints to his employer about those permit violations has established the predicate substantial public policy required to prima facie prove that the employer’s motivation for the discharge was the contravention of public policy. View "Frohnapfel v. Arcelormittal USA LLC" on Justia Law

After a jury-waived trial, Petitioner was found guilty of battery. The court found that the battery was sexually motivated and ordered Petitioner to register as a sex offender. The Supreme Court affirmed the battery conviction but reversed the finding that the offense was sexually motivated, holding (1) Petitioner’s due process rights were violated by the State’s failure to provide pretrial notice of its intent to seek a finding of sexual motivation, and the trial court’s finding of sexual motivation and concomitant registration requirements constituted plain error requiring reversal; and (2) the evidence was sufficient to support the conclusion that Petitioner committed battery. View "State v. Seen" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Respondent was convicted of one felony count of abduction with intent to defile and one misdemeanor count of battery. Respondent later filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, asserting that his right to a fair trial was violated because he was briefly placed in handcuffs in view of some members of the jury. The circuit court agreed, granted the writ, and vacated Respondent’s convictions. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Respondent being handcuffed in view of “at least some of the jurors” for a brief period of time was not sufficient to establish reversible error, nor grounds for a mistrial. View "Ballard v. Meckling" on Justia Law

Defendant was found guilty of two counts of attempted murder in the first degree, three counts of malicious assault, and other offenses arising from Defendant’s acts of deliberately shooting a man twice in the back and, in the process, accidentally shooting an eight-year-old girl. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, holding, primarily, that the circuit court erred in allowing a witness to make a blanket assertion of the Fifth Amendment without requiring the witness invoke his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination in front of the jury, thus violating Defendant’s constitutional right to compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, but the error was harmless. View "State v. Herbert" on Justia Law

In 1992, Petitioner was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment with the recommendation of mercy. In 1995, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, which the circuit court denied. In 2012, Petitioner filed a second amended petition for writ of habeas corpus. In 2013, Petitioner was paroled. The circuit court dismissed the habeas petition as moot because Petitioner no longer satisfied the statutory requirement of being incarcerated and because Petitioner received the relief he sought - release from custody. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, as a parolee, Petitioner was no longer incarcerated, and therefore, he was no entitled to seek post-conviction habeas relief. View "Cline v. Mirandy" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Petitioner was convicted of second degree murder. Petitioner was sentenced to a determinate term of forty years in prison. Petitioner appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in the manner in which it conducted a suppression hearing concerning his videotaped statement and erred in finding that a statement he made was voluntarily given to the police. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Petitioner’s challenges to the suppression hearing failed; and (2) under the circumstances, the circuit court correctly determined that Petitioner’s statement was voluntary and in admitting the statement into evidence. View "State v. Marcum" on Justia Law

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Defendant pled guilty to two charges under an indictment - obtaining money by false pretenses and fraudulent scheme - and six counts in an information. Defendant later filed a motion to correct his sentence under W. Va. R. Crim. P. 35(a), contending that his two felony convictions under the indictment violated the prohibition against double jeopardy. The circuit court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that double jeopardy principles do not preclude a conviction for a fraudulent scheme offense in addition to a conviction for any other offense arising out of the same transaction or occurrence. View "State v. Coles" on Justia Law

The West Virginia Division of Motor Vehicles (DMV) revoked the driver’s licenses of Respondents following their arrests for driving under the influence of alcohol. The Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) reversed the revocation of Respondents’ driver’s licenses, concluding that the evidence did not establish that Respondents had been lawfully arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol. The circuit court denied the DMV’s petitions for judicial review. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for reinstatement of the respective DMV orders revoking Respondents’ driver’s licenses, holding that Respondents were lawfully arrested, and the OAH’s findings to the contrary were clearly wrong.View "Dale v. Odum" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first degree robbery and conspiracy and sentenced to serve fifty-two to sixty years in prison. Defendant appealed the denial of his motion to suppress. The Supreme Court issued a Memorandum Decision holding Defendant's appeal in abeyance to permit the circuit court to enter an order on the issues of whether the Drug Enforcement administration (DEA) properly issued an administrative subpoena to obtain Defendant's cellular phone records and whether the DEA properly released that information with members of the police department. On remand, the circuit court entered an amended order denying Defendant's motion to suppress. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's amended order denying Defendant's motion to suppress, holding (1) the police department acted improperly toward the DEA in obtaining Defendant's phone records; (2) Defendant had no constitutionally protected legitimate expectation of privacy in his phone records, and thus, the exclusionary rule did not apply in this case; and (3) Defendant did not have standing to question the validity of the subpoena in a state court proceeding.View "State v. Clark" on Justia Law