Justia West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, were former students in the nursing program at Salem International University (Salem). When Plaintiffs enrolled, they signed enrollment agreements that contained an arbitration clause. Plaintiffs filed a putative class action complaint against Salem and its president (collectively, Salem) alleging that they were denied the opportunity to complete their coursework in nursing at Salem as a result of the nursing program’s loss of accreditation. Salem filed a motion to stay proceedings pending mandatory alternative dispute resolution. The circuit court denied the motion, concluding that the arbitration agreement did not include an enforceable class action litigation waiver. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the arbitration agreement acted as a class action litigation waiver barring Plaintiffs from seeking judicial relief as a class. View "Salem International University v. Bates" on Justia Law

This litigation arose out of the construction of the home of Randie Lawson and Deanna Lawson (together, Respondents). G & G Builders, Inc. (Petitioner) filed suit asserting that it was owed $303,686 under the parties’ construction agreement. Respondents asserted a counterclaim for breach of contract. Petitioner then filed a motion to dismiss Respondents’ counterclaim and to compel arbitration. The circuit court denied the motion, concluding that the arbitration provisions in the construction agreement were not binding on Randie because they were set forth in a document that was never provided to him, nor were they binding on Deanna, who was a non-signatory to the agreement. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in concluding that there was no agreement between the parties to arbitrate their dispute. View "G & G Builders, Inc. v. Lawson" on Justia Law

Robert Perry was issued a Citibank MasterCard account in 1998. The terms and conditions of the Citibank Card Agreement governing Perry’s account included an arbitration agreement. In 2010, Citibank filed a debt collection action against Perry seek to recover the balance owed on Perry’s account. In 2015, Perry filed an answer to Citibank’s complaint and a class counterclaim alleging that Citibank had violated the West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection Act. Thereafter, Citibank filed a motion asking the court to compel arbitration of the parties’ claims. The circuit court concluded that Citibank had implicitly waived its right to arbitration by filing suit in circuit court and waiting nearly five years before seeking to invoke its contractual right to arbitrate. Citibank appealed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Citibank did not waive its right to compel arbitration in this matter. Remanded. View "Citibank, N.A. v. Perry" on Justia Law

Plaintiff signed a contract with Defendant for the construction of a house. The contract contained an arbitration clause. Plaintiff later brought suit against Defendant, claiming that there were defects in the house. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss and compel arbitration. The circuit court denied the motion, finding that the arbitration clause was unconscionable. Defendant appealed, arguing that the circuit court erred by ruling on questions of arbitrability despite the existence of a delegation provision in the arbitration agreement that vested the arbitrator with authority to determine issues of arbitrability relating to the dispute. The Supreme Court determined that the circuit court was within its rights not to enforce the delegation language because the language did not reflect the parties’ clear and unmistakable intention to delegate issues about the validity, revocability, or enforceability of the arbitration agreement to an arbitrator. The United States Supreme Court granted Defendant’s requested writ of certiorari, vacated the Supreme Court’s opinion, and remanded for further consideration in light of their decision in DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia. The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court’s order, holding that because Plaintiffs never specifically challenged the delegation language before the circuit court or Supreme Court, Plaintiffs waived any right to challenge the delegation language. Remanded for arbitration. View "Schumacher Homes of Circleville v. Spencer" on Justia Law

Bayles rolled over his 401(k) retirement account, signing an Ameriprise Brokerage Individual Retirement Account Application. Bayles later signed an Active Portfolios Application-IRA Account Application. The first page of each application states that a copy of the related Brokerage Agreement must be provided to the client; the IRA Application states: You acknowledge that you have received and read the Ameriprise Brokerage Client Agreement and agree to abide by its terms….. This brokerage account is governed by a predispute arbitration clause which is found on Section 26.... You acknowledge receipt of the predispute arbitration clause." Similar language appears in the Portfolios Application. Bayles died in 2013. His wife thought she was the beneficiary, but decedent’s children were the designated primary beneficiaries on both accounts. Mrs. Bayles challenged Ameriprise’s payout of the proceeds. The defendants unsuccessfully moved to compel arbitration. The trial court found the absence of a signature on a brokerage agreement created an ambiguity that invalidated the arbitration clause. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reversed and remanded. Decedent signed the IRA Application, expressly acknowledging the arbitration clause, but there are unresolved issues, including whether the arbitration clause is unconscionable and whether anyof Mrs. Bayles’ claims “fall within the substantive scope of that arbitration agreement.” View "Jeffrey N. Evans/Ameriprise Fin. Servs. v. Bayles" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, who was employed by Defendant, signed an employment agreement providing that all disputes with Defendant shall be resolved through arbitration. After Plaintiff’s employment ended, Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging that Defendant did not timely pay him his final wages as required by the West Virginia Wage Payment and Collection Act. After a seven-month delay, Defendant filed a motion to compel arbitration. The circuit court granted the motion, dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint, and compelled the parties to participate in arbitration. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant did not waive its right to arbitrate through its acts and language. View "Parsons v. Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc." on Justia Law

Respondents entered into a loan agreement with Nationstar Mortgage, LLC. As part of the mortgage loan transaction, Respondents signed an arbitration agreement. Respondents later filed a complaint alleging that Nationstar engaged in predatory lending practices and abusive and unlawful debt collection in connection with the mortgage loan. Nationstar filed a motion to compel arbitration. The circuit court denied the motion, concluding that the arbitration agreement was both procedurally and substantively unconscionable. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Respondents did not demonstrate that the arbitration agreement was either procedurally or substantively unconscionable. Remanded. View "Nationstar Mortgage, LLC v. West" on Justia Law

Ryan Cunningham, Ronald LeGrand and four other individuals signed an operating agreement of Mountain Country Partners, LLC. Cunningham instituted a civil action seeking injunctive relief for the purpose of gaining operating control of the company. The case was stayed pending arbitration pursuant to the mandatory arbitration clause contained in the operating agreement. Legrand and Mountain Country filed five counterclaims against Cunningham. After a hearing, the arbitrator denied Cunningham’s claim and awarded relief against him based on Defendants’ counterclaims. The arbitrator ordered Cunningham to pay Mountain Country $113,717 in damages, as well as attorney’s fees and costs. Cunningham filed a motion to vacate the arbitration award, arguing that the arbitrator manifestly disregarded the law of West Virginia, improperly considered hearsay evidence, and refused to reopen the proceedings for rebuttal evidence. The circuit court denied Cunningham’s motion and confirmed the arbitration award. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Cunningham failed to identify any valid basis for setting aside the arbitration award. View "Cunningham v. LeGrand" on Justia Law

This appeal involved three different leases negotiated by Defendant between plaintiff-landowners and an oil and gas company. Each of the three leases engendered a different lawsuit against Defendant. In each case, Plaintiffs claimed that the nature of the services provided by Defendant constituted the unauthorized practice of law. Defendant moved to dismiss Plaintiffs’ lawsuits and sought to compel Plaintiffs to participate in arbitration pursuant to the arbitration clause in each lease. Plaintiffs challenged the arbitration clauses as void on the grounds that the arbitration clauses were contrary to public policy because they were procured through the unauthorized practice of law. In all three suits, the circuit court concluded that a plaintiff’s claim that a defendant engaged in the unauthorized practice of law can never, as a matter of matter of state law, be referred to arbitration. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that any state-based rule that prohibits outright the arbitration of a particular type of claim is preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act. View "Geological Assessment & Leasing v. O'Hara" on Justia Law

The complex issues at issue in these three consolidated appeals revolved around four overlapping leases to extract oil and gas from land owned by Plaintiff. Each lease contained an arbitration clause. Plaintiff filed the instant case against Defendants seeking a declaration as to which lease was controlling as to which defendants and seeking damages from Defendants. The circuit court entered an order voiding two of the four leases, addressing the substantive terms of two other leases, and compelling the parties to arbitrate any remaining claims by Plaintiff. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the circuit court (1) properly found the arbitration clause in one lease to be unenforceable and correctly ruled that the entire lease was unenforceable; (2) erred in compelling certain defendants to participate in arbitration under the terms of a second lease but did not err when it made findings of fact and conclusions of law that addressed the substance of Plaintiff’s claims regarding that lease; (3) erred in voiding a third lease, and its included arbitration clause, in violation the doctrine of severability; and (4) erred in its substantive rulings interpreting a fourth lease, as the court should have referred questions about the lease to arbitration. View "Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC v. Hickman" on Justia Law