Justia West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The case involves a class action lawsuit brought by Jacklin Romeo, Susan S. Rine, and Debra Snyder Miller against Antero Resources Corporation. The plaintiffs, who own oil and gas interests in Harrison County, West Virginia, allege that Antero breached the terms of their leases by failing to pay the full one-eighth royalty specified in the leases. They argue that Antero improperly deducted postproduction costs from the gross sale proceeds of the gas, contrary to West Virginia Supreme Court precedents in Wellman v. Energy Resources, Inc. and Estate of Tawney v. Columbia Natural Resources, L.L.C.The United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia, presided over by Chief Judge Thomas S. Kleeh, certified two questions to the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia. The first question asked whether the requirements of Wellman and Estate of Tawney extend only to the "first available market" as opposed to the "point of sale" when the duty to market is implicated. The second question asked whether the marketable product rule extends beyond gas to require a lessee to pay royalties on natural gas liquids (NGLs) and, if so, whether lessors share in the cost of processing, manufacturing, and transporting the NGLs to sale.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reaffirmed its previous rulings in Wellman and Estate of Tawney, holding that the requirements extend to the point of sale, not just to the first available market. The court also held that royalties are payable on NGLs, but absent express language in the lease, lessors do not share in the costs of processing, manufacturing, and transporting residue gas and NGLs to the point of sale. The court emphasized that any deductions for postproduction costs must be clearly and unambiguously stated in the lease agreements. View "Romeo v. Antero Resources Corporation" on Justia Law

The case involves Elaine Neidig, who had three mammograms at Valley Health System's Winchester Medical Center between 2016 and 2019. In 2019, the FDA found that some mammograms performed at the facility had serious image quality deficiencies. Neidig received a notification from Valley Health about these issues and subsequently filed a class action lawsuit alleging that Valley Health misrepresented the quality of its mammography services. She claimed that the mammograms were worthless and sought economic damages, including statutory damages for consumer protection violations, compensatory damages, and contract damages. Neidig did not claim any physical or emotional injury.The United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia dismissed Neidig's complaint, ruling that her claims fell under the West Virginia Medical Professional Liability Act (MPLA) and were barred by the MPLA’s statute of limitations. The court found that the MPLA applied because the claims were related to health care services, despite Neidig's argument that her claims were purely economic and not based on physical or emotional injury.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit certified a question to the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, asking whether the MPLA applies to claims where the plaintiff disclaims any form of physical or emotional injury. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reformulated the question to ask whether the MPLA applies when the plaintiff claims only economic damages and disclaims all liability based on physical injury, emotional injury, or death.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia held that the MPLA does not apply to a suit against a health care provider or health care facility when the plaintiff claims only economic damages and disclaims all liability based on physical injury, emotional injury, or death. The court emphasized that the MPLA requires a predicate claim arising from the death or injury of a person, and since Neidig's claims were solely for economic damages, the MPLA did not apply. View "Neidig v. Valley Health System" on Justia Law

In December 2020, Gavin Smith's grandfather discovered Smith's mother, stepfather, and two younger brothers shot to death in their home. Smith, who was sixteen at the time, was later found at his girlfriend's grandmother's house and arrested. Smith's girlfriend, Rebecca Walker, was also charged but entered a plea agreement to testify against Smith in exchange for a reduced sentence.The Circuit Court of Kanawha County transferred Smith from juvenile to adult criminal jurisdiction. A grand jury indicted him on four counts of first-degree murder and four counts of using a firearm during a felony. During the trial, Walker testified about her plea deal and the events of the murders. Smith's counsel cross-examined her about the life sentence she avoided, leading to a court instruction clarifying that Smith would be eligible for parole after fifteen years due to his age at the time of the crime.The jury convicted Smith of three counts of first-degree murder, one count of second-degree murder, and one count of using a firearm during a felony. The court sentenced him to three life terms with mercy plus fifty years, all to run consecutively.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case. Smith argued that the circuit court erred by informing the jury about his parole eligibility, which prejudiced the jury. The Supreme Court agreed, finding that the circuit court's instruction on parole eligibility was improper and prejudicial. The court held that outside the context of cases involving a recommendation of mercy, it is improper to inform the jury about sentencing possibilities. Consequently, the Supreme Court vacated Smith's convictions and the circuit court's sentencing order, remanding the case for a new trial. View "State v. Smith" on Justia Law

The case involves petitioners P.F. and R.F., who sought custody and visitation rights for their grandchild, A.F., following the termination of A.F.'s mother's parental rights due to abuse and neglect. The Department of Human Services (DHS) had previously removed A.F. from her mother's custody in 2017 due to deplorable living conditions in the home shared with the petitioners. In 2021, A.F. was again removed from her mother's custody and placed with foster parents, K.B. and M.B., who had previously cared for her. Petitioners moved to intervene and obtain custody and visitation in 2022, but the DHS opposed their motion, citing past maltreatment substantiations against petitioner R.F.The Circuit Court of Wood County initially denied petitioners' motion for visitation and directed the DHS to conduct a home study. Although the DHS initially denied the home study based on past substantiations, the DHS's Board of Review later reversed these substantiations and ordered a new home study, which was ultimately approved. Despite this, the DHS, guardian ad litem, and foster parents opposed placement with the petitioners, arguing that A.F. was thriving with the foster parents and had no bond with the petitioners.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case and found that the circuit court's order denying petitioners' motions for custody and visitation lacked sufficient findings to demonstrate that it properly considered the grandparent preference statute, West Virginia Code § 49-4-114(a)(3). The court emphasized that the statute presumes placement with grandparents is in the best interests of the child unless the record shows otherwise. The court vacated the circuit court's order and remanded the case for further proceedings, instructing the lower court to conduct a new evidentiary hearing and make detailed findings regarding the grandparent preference and the best interests of A.F. View "In re A.F." on Justia Law

Caitlin Workman, a maintenance trainee at a coal mine, was injured on November 8, 2021, when a chain under tension snapped and struck her right upper extremity. She was diagnosed with a right shoulder contusion and back laceration. Following the injury, she experienced increased pain, weakness in her right arm, grip strength deficit, and a noticeable tremor. Despite conflicting medical evidence, the claim administrator determined that she had reached maximum medical improvement (MMI) and suspended her temporary total disability (TTD) benefits. The Workers’ Compensation Board of Review affirmed this decision.The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) also affirmed the Board’s decision, concluding that the Board was not clearly wrong in finding that Ms. Workman had reached MMI and that her continuing symptoms were unrelated to the compensable injury. The ICA relied on the opinion of Dr. Mukkamala, who conducted an independent medical evaluation and found no need for further diagnostic studies or treatment.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case and found that the Board failed to properly weigh the medical evidence as required by West Virginia Code § 23-4-1g(a). The Court noted that the Board did not adequately explain why it favored Dr. Mukkamala’s opinion over the medical evidence provided by Ms. Workman’s treating physicians, who indicated that her symptoms were related to the compensable injury and that she had not reached MMI. The Court also found that the Board’s conclusion that Ms. Workman’s symptoms were unrelated to the compensable injury was clearly wrong.The Supreme Court of Appeals reversed the ICA’s decision and remanded the case to the Board of Review with directions to award Ms. Workman TTD benefits from November 9, 2021, through April 9, 2022, and to authorize additional testing and treatment as supported by proper medical evidence. View "Workman v. ACNR Resources, Inc." on Justia Law

The case involves Francis Kaess, who owns mineral interests in land in Pleasants County, West Virginia, subject to an oil and gas lease with BB Land, LLC. The lease provides for in-kind royalties, meaning Kaess is entitled to a portion of the physical oil and gas produced. However, Kaess did not take his share in-kind, and BB Land sold his share and deducted postproduction costs from his royalties.The United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia reviewed the case and denied BB Land's motion for summary judgment on the issue of improper deductions. The court found that the requirements for deducting postproduction costs, as established in Wellman v. Energy Resources, Inc. and Estate of Tawney v. Columbia Natural Resources, LLC, apply to in-kind leases. BB Land then sought to certify questions to the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the certified questions. The court reaffirmed the principles established in Wellman and Estate of Tawney, which require that any deductions for postproduction costs must be expressly stated in the lease, identify specific deductions, and indicate the method of calculating these deductions. The court held that these requirements also apply to leases with in-kind royalty provisions.The court concluded that there is an implied duty to market the minerals in oil and gas leases with in-kind royalty provisions. If the lessor does not take their share in-kind, the lessee must market and sell the lessor's share along with their own and pay the lessor a royalty based on the gross proceeds received at the first point of sale to an unaffiliated third-party purchaser, free from any deductions for postproduction expenses. The court answered both certified questions in the affirmative. View "Kaess v. BB Land, LLC" on Justia Law

The case involves Deliezha Davonte Gravely, who was pulled over by a police officer for speeding. During the stop, the officer discovered that Gravely was driving with a revoked license due to a DUI and found a loaded firearm in his pocket. Gravely was subsequently indicted on multiple charges, including unlawful possession of a firearm by a prohibited person and carrying a concealed firearm by a prohibited person, based on his prior conviction for conspiracy to commit first-degree robbery.The Circuit Court of Mercer County ruled that Gravely's prior conviction for conspiracy to commit first-degree robbery qualified as a "felony crime of violence against the person of another" under West Virginia Code § 61-7-7(b). Gravely was convicted by a jury on all counts and sentenced to imprisonment. He appealed, arguing that the circuit court erred in classifying his conspiracy conviction as a crime of violence.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case de novo, focusing on whether the elements of conspiracy under West Virginia Code § 61-10-31 include a violent act against a person. The court applied the elements test from State v. Mills, which requires examining the statutory elements of the predicate offense rather than the specific conduct of the defendant. The court found that the elements of conspiracy—an agreement to commit an offense and an overt act to effect the conspiracy—do not require a violent act against a person.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia held that conspiracy to commit first-degree robbery is not a "felony crime of violence against the person of another" for the purposes of West Virginia Code § 61-7-7(b). Consequently, the court reversed Gravely's convictions for unlawful possession of a firearm by a prohibited person and carrying a concealed firearm by a prohibited person, and remanded the case for resentencing on his remaining convictions. View "State v. Gravely" on Justia Law

In the early morning of June 28, 2014, Ms. Taylor Hawkridge was shot and killed in the parking lot of her apartment complex. Eyewitnesses reported seeing a man in a hooded sweatshirt fleeing the scene and entering a dark Dodge Charger. Ms. Hawkridge had a verbal altercation with Nasstashia Van Camp Powell at Vixens Gentlemen’s Club, where she worked. Ms. Powell, after being convicted of second-degree murder, implicated Richard Small and Joseph Mason in the murder, stating they were paid to kill Ms. Hawkridge because she was a police informant. Mr. Small was interviewed by law enforcement multiple times, including a June 2018 interview where he ambiguously mentioned needing a lawyer.The Circuit Court of Berkeley County held a joint trial for Mr. Small and Mr. Mason. Mr. Small filed motions to exclude evidence of Mr. Mason’s gang affiliation and to suppress his June 2018 statement, arguing he had invoked his right to counsel. The court denied these motions, finding the gang affiliation evidence intrinsic to the crimes and Mr. Small’s statement ambiguous. The jury convicted Mr. Small of conspiracy to commit murder and first-degree murder, and he was sentenced to life without parole.On appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, Mr. Small argued his constitutional rights were violated by his and his counsel’s absence from critical-stage hearings, the admission of prejudicial evidence, the failure to sever his trial from Mr. Mason’s, the denial of his motion to suppress, and improper comments by the State during the mercy phase. The court found no error, holding that the hearings were not critical stages for Mr. Small, the evidence was intrinsic and relevant, Mr. Small did not properly move to sever, his statement was not an unequivocal request for counsel, and the State’s comments did not constitute plain error. The court affirmed Mr. Small’s convictions and sentence. View "State v. Small" on Justia Law

In the early morning of June 28, 2014, Ms. Taylor Hawkridge was shot and killed in her apartment complex parking lot. Eyewitnesses reported seeing a man in a hooded sweatshirt fleeing the scene in a dark Dodge Charger. Ms. Hawkridge had a verbal altercation with Nasstashia Van Camp Powell at her workplace, Vixens Gentlemen’s Club, the night before. Ms. Powell, who was later convicted of second-degree murder, implicated Joseph Mason and Richard Small in the murder, stating they were paid to kill Ms. Hawkridge because she was a police informant.The Circuit Court of Berkeley County sentenced Mr. Mason to life imprisonment without mercy for first-degree murder and a consecutive term of one to five years for conspiracy. Mr. Mason appealed, arguing that the court erred in admitting a photograph of a social media post without proper authentication, allowing evidence of his gang and drug affiliations, permitting hearsay testimony, failing to sever his trial from Mr. Small’s, and denying him a fair trial through cumulative error.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case and found no error. The court held that the photograph of the Instagram post was properly authenticated through distinctive characteristics and testimony. The evidence of Mr. Mason’s gang and drug affiliations and his dislike of informants was deemed intrinsic to the charged crimes, providing necessary context. The court also found that Ms. Linton’s testimony about Ms. Powell’s prior consistent statements was admissible to rebut charges of recent fabrication. Mr. Mason’s argument for severance was waived as it was not raised in the lower court. Finally, the court found no cumulative error, as none of the individual claims had merit. The court affirmed Mr. Mason’s convictions and sentence. View "State v. Mason" on Justia Law

The petitioner, David Hunter Lewis, was convicted in the Circuit Court of Marion County, West Virginia, of second-degree murder and use of a firearm during the commission of a felony. The incident occurred on December 15, 2020, when the petitioner shot the victim, Dylan Harr, after an argument at an apartment. The petitioner claimed the shooting was accidental, while the State argued it was intentional. The petitioner was sentenced to concurrent forty- and ten-year terms of imprisonment.In the lower court, the petitioner moved to suppress statements made to police, arguing they were obtained in violation of his Miranda rights. The circuit court ruled that statements made after the petitioner signed a waiver of rights at the police station were admissible, despite his earlier invocation of the right to remain silent at the time of his arrest. The petitioner also filed post-trial motions challenging the sufficiency of the evidence and the admission of character evidence about the victim, which the circuit court denied.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case and found that the State's introduction of extensive character evidence about the victim, which was irrelevant to the petitioner's guilt or innocence, constituted plain error. The court held that this error affected the petitioner's substantial rights and seriously impacted the fairness of the trial. The court also addressed the admissibility of the petitioner's statements to police, concluding that the circuit court did not err in admitting the statements made after the petitioner signed a waiver of rights at the police station. Ultimately, the Supreme Court of Appeals reversed the petitioner's conviction and remanded the case for a new trial. View "State v. Lewis" on Justia Law