Justia West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Marietta Area Healthcare, Inc., Marietta Memorial Hospital, and Marietta Healthcare Physicians, Inc. (collectively "Marietta") filed a lawsuit against Camden-Clark Memorial Hospital Corporation, Camden-Clark Health Services, Inc., West Virginia University Hospitals, Inc., and West Virginia United Health System, Inc. (collectively "Camden-Clark"). Marietta alleged that Camden-Clark attempted to economically disadvantage them by causing its agents and employees to initiate and pursue a spurious qui tam action against Marietta. The claims included malicious prosecution, tortious interference, abuse of process, fraudulent legal process, civil conspiracy, negligent supervision, aiding and abetting tortious conduct, and vicarious liability.The United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia reviewed the case and denied Camden-Clark's motion to dismiss seven of the eight claims. However, the court deferred ruling on the negligent supervision claim, noting that the law regarding negligent supervision in West Virginia was unsettled. The district court then certified three questions to the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia regarding the viability and elements of a negligent supervision claim and whether intentional or reckless torts by an employee could form the basis for such a claim.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia held that a claim for negligent supervision is viable under West Virginia common law. The court clarified that the elements of a negligent supervision claim include the traditional elements of negligence—duty, breach, causation, and damages—along with the necessity of demonstrating a tortious act or omission by the employee. The court further held that an employer could be liable for negligent supervision regardless of whether the employee's conduct was negligent, reckless, or intentional, provided the elements of the claim are met. View "Camden-Clark Memorial Hospital, Inc. v. Marietta Area Healthcare, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2021, Scott Michael Andrew Hundley fatally stabbed Thomas Cekada Jr. after an altercation. Hundley claimed self-defense, stating that Cekada had brandished a firearm at him twice, once at a Dollar General store and later during a car collision on Mountain Mission Road. Hundley was indicted for first-degree murder by the Jefferson County Grand Jury.The Circuit Court of Jefferson County held a pre-trial hearing where Hundley’s motion to suppress his statements to law enforcement was denied. The court found that Hundley’s statement about needing a lawyer was equivocal and that he was not in custody at the time. The court also granted the State’s motion to exclude evidence of Cekada’s drug use, ruling it irrelevant without expert testimony linking the drugs to irrational behavior. The court denied the State’s request to introduce evidence of Hundley’s prior stabbing incident under Rule 404(b).At trial, the State presented testimony from officers and witnesses, including evidence that Cekada’s hands were bloody but his firearm was not. Hundley testified, reiterating his self-defense claim. The court allowed the State to argue in rebuttal that the lack of blood on the firearm disproved Hundley’s self-defense claim. The jury found Hundley guilty of second-degree murder, and he was sentenced to forty-five years in prison, including a recidivist enhancement.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case and found no abuse of discretion in the circuit court’s evidentiary rulings, including the exclusion of the toxicology report and text messages about Cekada’s drug use. The court also upheld the circuit court’s control over closing arguments and found no prosecutorial misconduct or Brady violations. The court affirmed Hundley’s conviction and sentence. View "State v. Hundley" on Justia Law

The City of Huntington and the Cabell County Commission filed lawsuits against AmerisourceBergen Drug Corp., Cardinal Health, Inc., and McKesson Corp., alleging that the defendants contributed to the opioid epidemic by distributing excessive quantities of opioids to pharmacies. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants' actions created a public nuisance that should be abated under West Virginia common law. The cases were consolidated and remanded to the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia, which held a ten-week bench trial.The district court ruled in favor of the defendants, concluding that the plaintiffs failed to prove that the defendants' conduct was unreasonable or that it proximately caused the opioid epidemic. The court found that the defendants substantially complied with their duties under the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) and that the plaintiffs did not provide sufficient evidence to show that the volume of opioids distributed was excessive or that the defendants failed to maintain effective controls against diversion. The district court also determined that the plaintiffs' proposed abatement plan was not appropriate.The plaintiffs appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, contesting the district court's factual findings and legal conclusions. The Fourth Circuit certified a question to the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, asking whether conditions caused by the distribution of a controlled substance can constitute a public nuisance under West Virginia common law and, if so, what the elements of such a claim are.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia declined to answer the certified question, citing the disputed factual findings and related legal conclusions on appeal. The court emphasized that it could not address the legal issue without a sufficiently precise and undisputed factual record, and any answer would be advisory given the unsettled facts. View "City of Huntington and Cabell County Commission v. AmerisourceBergen Drug Corporation" on Justia Law

The Department of Health and Human Resources filed a petition alleging that S.N.M. abused and neglected her three children, K.A, Jr., N.A, and J.B. The circuit court found abuse and neglect had occurred and terminated S.N.M.’s parental rights as to all three children. S.N.M. appealed, and the case was remanded with directions to determine if the circuit court had subject-matter jurisdiction as to J.B. and to rule on S.N.M.’s motion for a post-adjudicatory improvement period. After remand, the circuit court denied the motion and terminated S.N.M.’s parental rights to J.B. again.The circuit court found that J.B.’s paternal grandmother had sought guardianship due to the parents' substance abuse and other issues. The court also found that J.B. visited her mother’s home and was subjected to the same conditions as her half-siblings. However, the record lacked evidence of when these visits occurred or if the conditions existed at the time of the petition’s filing. The circuit court denied a post-adjudicatory improvement period for S.N.M., citing her continued drug use, association with violent partners, and failure to acknowledge her substance abuse issues.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case. It affirmed the circuit court’s decision to deny a post-adjudicatory improvement period for K.A., Jr., and N.A., finding no abuse of discretion. However, it reversed the termination of parental rights as to J.B., concluding that the circuit court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. The court found that the circuit court’s findings were insufficient to establish jurisdiction over J.B. and remanded the case with directions to dismiss the petition regarding J.B. for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. View "In re K.A., N.A., and J.B." on Justia Law

Petitioner, a sixteen-year-old, applied to the Mountaineer Challenge Academy (MCA) as an alternative to public high school. During the acclimation period, he injured his knee after exiting his bunk improperly. He was evaluated by medical personnel, placed on restricted duty, and later cleared for full duty. Subsequently, he was discharged from the program for noncompliance. Petitioner sued MCA and the West Virginia Army National Guard, alleging that their failure to enforce safety policies caused his injury and led to his unjust dismissal.The Circuit Court granted summary judgment in favor of the respondents, citing qualified immunity. The court found that the actions of the MCA staff involved discretionary functions and did not violate any clearly established statutory or constitutional rights. The Intermediate Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, agreeing that the cadre’s supervision fell within discretionary actions and that there was no violation of the petitioner’s right to an education or any statutory duty to supervise.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case de novo. The court held that the cadre’s actions were discretionary and protected by qualified immunity. It found no violation of clearly established rights or laws, as MCA is not part of the public school system and thus not subject to the same constitutional protections. The court also concluded that the petitioner failed to demonstrate that the respondents acted fraudulently, maliciously, or oppressively. Consequently, the court affirmed the lower courts' decisions, upholding the grant of summary judgment in favor of the respondents. View "Moorhead v. West Virginia Army National Guard" on Justia Law

Brian Allen Merchant Jones was indicted for conspiracy to commit felony controlled substance offenses, use of a firearm in the commission of a felony, possession of a firearm by a prohibited person, and involuntary manslaughter after he shot and killed his friend, Zackerie Howser, on September 15, 2020. The victim and Jones were involved in drug trafficking, and the shooting occurred shortly after Jones arrived at the victim's home to deliver methamphetamine. Jones pled guilty to possession of a firearm by a prohibited person and involuntary manslaughter but proceeded to trial on the conspiracy and firearm charges.The Circuit Court of Marion County convicted Jones of conspiracy to commit felony controlled substance offenses and use of a firearm in the commission of a felony. Jones filed post-trial motions for judgment of acquittal and a new trial, which were denied. He was sentenced to fifteen years for conspiracy, ten years for use of a firearm, five years for possession of a firearm by a prohibited person, and one year for involuntary manslaughter.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the hearsay testimony regarding the victim's statements about drug sales was admissible under Rule 804(b)(3) as statements against interest by an unavailable declarant. The court also found that the prosecutor's comments about Jones's flight during closing arguments, although improper, did not render the trial unfair. The court concluded that the evidence of Jones's involvement in the drug conspiracy and the use of a firearm during the commission of a felony was sufficient to support his convictions. The court affirmed the circuit court's judgment and sentencing order. View "State v. Jones" on Justia Law

A state agency, WorkForce West Virginia, and its Acting Commissioner, Scott A. Adkins, sought a writ of prohibition to prevent the enforcement of three orders issued by the Circuit Court of Kanawha County. These orders granted a writ of mandamus to the plaintiffs, denied WorkForce’s motion to dismiss, and allowed the plaintiffs to file a second amended complaint. The plaintiffs, who received unemployment benefits during the COVID-19 pandemic, alleged that WorkForce engaged in illegal collection activities by attempting to recover overpayments beyond the statutory time limits.The Circuit Court of Kanawha County ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, finding that WorkForce’s collection activities were time-barred by West Virginia Code § 21A-10-21, which imposes a two-year statute of limitations for recovering overpayments made due to error. The court also concluded that WorkForce could not determine overpayments due to nondisclosure or misrepresentation through its administrative process and must instead pursue such claims in circuit court. Based on this interpretation, the circuit court granted mandamus and injunctive relief, ordering WorkForce to cease its collection activities and comply with the statutory time limits.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case and found that the circuit court erred in its interpretation of the relevant statutes. The higher court concluded that the administrative process established by the Legislature allows WorkForce to determine whether overpayments occurred due to error, nondisclosure, or misrepresentation. The court emphasized that claimants must exhaust their administrative remedies before seeking judicial review, as mandated by West Virginia Code § 21A-7-19. Since the plaintiffs did not exhaust their administrative remedies, the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Appeals granted the writ of prohibition and directed the circuit court to dismiss the case. View "Adkins v. Bailey" on Justia Law

The petitioners, current and retired Natural Resources Police Officers employed by the West Virginia Division of Natural Resources (DNR), have been receiving a statutory "subsistence allowance" since 1996. This allowance was included in their reported "compensation" to the West Virginia Consolidated Public Retirement Board (the Board) for calculating retirement annuities under the Public Employees Retirement System (PERS). In 2014, the Board discovered this inclusion was erroneous and decided to correct it by refunding overpaid contributions to active and inactive officers and adjusting retirement annuities for retired officers.The Circuit Court of Kanawha County reversed the Board's decision, finding the subsistence allowance was pensionable compensation. On appeal, the West Virginia Supreme Court held in West Virginia Consolidated Public Retirement Board v. Clark (Clark I) that the subsistence allowance was not "compensation" for PERS purposes and that the Board failed to correct the error in a timely manner for retired officers. The case was remanded for further proceedings.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed two certified questions from the Circuit Court of Kanawha County. The first question asked if the holding in Clark I required the subsistence pay received by all retired and active DNR officers to be included in calculating their pensionable income. The court answered "no," clarifying that Clark I's holding was limited to retired officers and did not apply to active and inactive officers. The second question asked if the petitioners were entitled to recover reasonable attorneys' fees from the Board. The court declined to answer, stating that it did not present an issue of law but rather a question of fact. View "Clark v. West Virginia Consolidated Public Retirement Board" on Justia Law

James Cooper was injured in a car accident while riding as a passenger in a car owned by Rick Huffman. Both Cooper and Huffman were employees of Pison Management, LLC, and were driving to a jobsite during their employment. Cooper's injuries exceeded the at-fault driver's insurance limits, so he sought underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage under Pison’s commercial automobile policy issued by Erie Insurance Property & Casualty Company. The policy provided liability coverage for two vehicles owned by Pison and a class of non-owned vehicles, but UIM coverage was only provided for the owned vehicles. Erie denied Cooper’s claim for UIM coverage.Erie filed a suit in federal district court seeking a declaration that the policy did not provide the UIM coverage Cooper sought. Cooper counterclaimed, arguing that West Virginia Code § 33-6-31 required Erie to offer UIM coverage for the class of non-owned vehicles. The district court ruled in favor of Cooper, holding that the statute required Erie to make a commercially reasonable offer of UIM coverage for all vehicles covered by the liability policy, including non-owned vehicles. Erie appealed this decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case. The court held that West Virginia Code § 33-6-31 does not require an insurer to offer UIM coverage for a class of non-owned vehicles when a commercial automobile insurance policy insures certain owned vehicles and a class of non-owned vehicles for liability protection. The court reasoned that UIM coverage is intended to protect the named insured and permissive users of the named insured’s vehicle, not to extend to non-owned vehicles. Therefore, the court answered the certified question in the negative and dismissed the case from its docket, returning the matter to the Fourth Circuit for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Erie Insurance Property & Casualty Company v. Cooper" on Justia Law

The petitioner, Jay Folse, purchased real property tax liens on two properties in Cabell County, West Virginia, in September 2021. He provided the necessary information to the respondents, G. Russell Rollyson, Jr., and Mark A. Hunt, to issue notices to redeem to the previous owners. However, some notices were returned as undeliverable. The respondents requested additional addresses and funds for personal service, which the petitioner did not provide. Instead, he filed a petition in the Circuit Court of Cabell County to compel the issuance of tax deeds.The circuit court dismissed the petition, stating that a writ of mandamus was required to compel the issuance of the tax deeds. The petitioner appealed to the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA), which affirmed the circuit court's decision, relying on the precedent set in Lemley v. Phillips, which required a writ of mandamus for such relief.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case and found that the ICA erred in its reliance on Lemley. The court noted that significant statutory changes had occurred since Lemley, providing a statutory remedy for compelling the issuance of notices to redeem and tax deeds. The court held that a writ of mandamus does not lie to compel the deputy commissioner to execute a deed for land purchased at a delinquent tax sale, as the remedy provided by West Virginia Code § 11A-3-60 is exclusive.The Supreme Court of Appeals reversed the ICA's decision and remanded the case to the circuit court for further proceedings to determine whether the petitioner satisfied all necessary requirements for the issuance of the tax deeds. The court emphasized the need for factual and legal determinations to be made by the circuit court in the first instance. View "Folse v. Rollyson" on Justia Law