Justia West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The case involves a dispute between several car dealers (Thornhill Auto Group, Moses Ford, and Astorg Ford of Parkersburg) and Ford Motor Company. The dealers had renovated their facilities to meet Ford's Trustmark standards under a voluntary Facility Assistance Program, which provided matching funds up to $750,000. These renovations included specific franchisor image elements required and approved by Ford. Later, Ford introduced the Lincoln Commitment Program (LCP), which offered additional incentives for dealers who constructed exclusive Lincoln facilities, known as Vitrine facilities. The dealers did not meet the new LCP standards and thus did not receive the full incentives.The dealers filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia, arguing that Ford's actions violated West Virginia Code section 17A-6A-10(1)(i). This statute prohibits manufacturers from requiring dealers to replace or substantially alter franchisor image elements installed within the preceding ten years if those elements were required and approved by the manufacturer. The district court found that the issue was a question of first impression and certified the question to the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia held that the ten-year grandfather clause in West Virginia Code section 17A-6A-10(1)(i) applies to the dealers. The Court found that the dealers' renovations under the Facility Assistance Program, which included franchisor image elements required and approved by Ford, fell within the statute's protection. Therefore, Ford could not require the dealers to replace or substantially alter those elements within ten years of their installation. The Court answered the certified question in the affirmative and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings. View "West Virginia Automobile and Truck Dealers' Association v. Ford Motor Co." on Justia Law

In 2015, the parental rights of H.M. and B.M.'s biological parents were terminated, and the children were adopted by their aunt, C.M. In 2019, the children were removed from C.M.'s home due to her substance abuse but were later returned after she completed an improvement period. In April 2022, new referrals indicated C.M. had relapsed, and the family was homeless. C.M. placed H.M. and B.M. in guardianships and entered a rehabilitation facility. DHS filed an abuse and neglect petition in May 2022. C.M. stipulated to substance abuse, and the court found the children to be abused and neglected. C.M. was granted an improvement period but failed to secure stable housing and employment and tested positive for drugs.The Circuit Court of Jefferson County held dispositional hearings and determined that C.M. did not substantially comply with her improvement period. The court placed H.M. in a legal guardianship with her foster mother, A.H., under West Virginia Code § 49-4-604(c)(5), and dismissed C.M. from the case, allowing only the GAL or DHS to seek modification of the disposition.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case and found that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in determining that C.M. failed to make sufficient improvement to be reunified with H.M. However, the court found errors in the dispositional order, specifically the dismissal of C.M. from the case and the provision for post-termination visitation at A.H.'s discretion. The court affirmed the decision to place H.M. in a legal guardianship but vacated the order in part and remanded the case for further proceedings to correct these deficiencies. View "In re H.M." on Justia Law

The case involves Francis Kaess, who owns mineral interests in land in Pleasants County, West Virginia, subject to an oil and gas lease with BB Land, LLC. The lease, dated January 6, 1979, provides for in-kind royalties, meaning Kaess is entitled to a portion of the physical oil and gas produced. BB Land began production in 2018, but Kaess did not take his share in-kind. Instead, BB Land sold Kaess' share and paid him royalties after deducting postproduction costs.Kaess filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia, alleging improper deductions of postproduction costs from his royalties, among other claims. The district court denied BB Land's motion for summary judgment on the improper deductions claim, finding that the requirements for deducting postproduction costs set forth in Wellman v. Energy Resources, Inc. and Estate of Tawney v. Columbia Natural Resources, LLC apply to in-kind leases. BB Land then moved to certify a question to the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case and answered two certified questions. First, the court held that there is an implied duty to market the minerals in oil and gas leases containing an in-kind royalty provision. If the lessor does not take physical possession of their share, the lessee must either deliver the lessor's share to a third-party purchaser near the wellhead, buy the lessor's share, or market and sell the lessor's share along with their own.Second, the court held that the requirements for deducting postproduction costs from royalties, as established in Wellman and Estate of Tawney, apply to leases with in-kind royalty provisions. Therefore, if the lessee markets and sells the lessor's share, the lessee must tender the lessor's percentage share of the gross proceeds, free from any deductions for postproduction expenses, received at the first point of sale to an unaffiliated third-party purchaser in an arm's length transaction. View "Francis Kaess v. BB Land, LLC" on Justia Law

The case involves a class action lawsuit brought by Jacklin Romeo, Susan S. Rine, and Debra Snyder Miller against Antero Resources Corporation. The plaintiffs, who own oil and gas interests in Harrison County, West Virginia, allege that Antero breached the terms of their leases by failing to pay the full one-eighth royalty specified in the leases. They argue that Antero improperly deducted postproduction costs from the gross sale proceeds of the gas, contrary to West Virginia Supreme Court precedents in Wellman v. Energy Resources, Inc. and Estate of Tawney v. Columbia Natural Resources, L.L.C.The United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia, which is handling the case, certified two questions to the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia. The first question asked whether the requirements of Wellman and Estate of Tawney extend only to the "first available market" as opposed to the "point of sale" when the duty to market is implicated. The second question asked whether the marketable product rule extends beyond gas to require a lessee to pay royalties on natural gas liquids (NGLs) and, if so, whether the lessors share in the cost of processing, manufacturing, and transporting the NGLs to sale.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia answered the first question in the negative, holding that the requirements of Wellman and Estate of Tawney extend to the point of sale, not just to the first available market. The court reaffirmed that the lessee must bear all costs incurred in exploring for, producing, marketing, and transporting the product to the point of sale unless the lease provides otherwise.For the second question, the court held that the marketable product rule extends beyond gas to require a lessee to pay royalties on NGLs. However, the court also held that absent express language in the lease to the contrary, the lessors do not share in the cost of processing, manufacturing, and transporting residue gas and NGLs to the point of sale. View "Jacklin Romeo, Susan S. Rine, and Debra Snyder Miller v. Antero Resources Corporation" on Justia Law

The case involves the custody of a minor child, M.M., who was removed from her mother's custody due to the mother's drug use and subsequent arrest. After the mother's death, M.M. was placed with foster parents, A.P.-1 and A.P.-2. The child's maternal aunt, E.L., intervened to seek custody. The West Virginia Department of Human Services (DHS) initially opposed E.L.'s intervention, alleging she had assisted in the child's "kidnapping" by the maternal grandmother, an allegation that was later unsubstantiated. E.L. moved from California to West Virginia to be closer to M.M. and was granted visitation rights.The Circuit Court of Putnam County held three permanency hearings and ultimately decided that it was in M.M.'s best interest to be placed permanently with E.L. The court made extensive findings of fact, noting that M.M. had formed a bond with E.L. during visitations and that E.L. could maintain M.M.'s relationships with her biological family. The court also considered that E.L. was well-equipped to meet M.M.'s medical and developmental needs and had no other children in her home, unlike the foster parents who had three other children with varying special needs.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case and affirmed the circuit court's decision. The court held that the circuit court had conducted a meticulous best-interest-of-the-child analysis, considering the child's bonds with both the foster parents and E.L., and the ability of E.L. to preserve important familial relationships. The court found no error in the circuit court's placement determination and concluded that the decision to grant permanent custody to E.L. was supported by the evidence and was in M.M.'s best interest. View "In re M.M" on Justia Law

The case involves the West Virginia Department of Human Services (DHS) and allegations of negligence in handling child protective services (CPS) investigations. DHS received multiple referrals regarding potential child abuse involving J.F.L., a registered sex offender living with J.M.K. and her children. DHS conducted investigations in 2015 and 2018, concluding there was no evidence of abuse or neglect. However, in 2020, another referral led to the discovery of sexual abuse by J.F.L., resulting in his indictment and conviction on numerous charges.The plaintiffs, representing the children, sued DHS, claiming negligence, gross negligence, and other wrongful acts, asserting that DHS failed to follow its internal policies, which they argued created clearly established statutory rights. They also claimed negligent training and supervision by DHS. DHS sought summary judgment based on qualified immunity, arguing that its internal policies did not constitute clearly established law.The Circuit Court of Kanawha County denied DHS's motion for summary judgment, stating that a jury should decide whether DHS's actions were oppressive and whether mandatory duties were not followed. The court also denied summary judgment on the negligent supervision and training claims.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case and concluded that DHS's internal policies, not being legislatively approved, could not create clearly established statutory rights. The court held that DHS was entitled to qualified immunity as the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that DHS violated any clearly established statutory or constitutional rights. Additionally, the plaintiffs did not provide evidence of improper motive or oppressive conduct by DHS employees. Consequently, the court reversed the circuit court's decision and remanded the case with directions to grant summary judgment in favor of DHS and dismiss the action. View "West Virginia Department of Human Services v. David B., Guardian ad Litem and Next Friend of J.B. and M.B., and S.M., Individually" on Justia Law

The case involves a grandmother (Grandmother) who was adjudicated as an abusing and neglectful parent to her grandchildren, B.L.-1, B.L.-2, K.L., M.L., and M.S. The West Virginia Department of Human Services (DHS) filed an abuse and neglect petition against the children's parents in 2018, and the children were placed with Grandmother. In 2021, several referrals were made to Child Protective Services (CPS) regarding Grandmother's care, leading to the children's removal from her home in December 2021 due to safety concerns and Grandmother's failure to inform DHS of her marriage. The DHS filed a Sixth Amended Petition in April 2022, alleging various forms of abuse and neglect by Grandmother.The Circuit Court of Barbour County held several hearings, concluding with a final adjudicatory hearing in March 2023. The court found that Grandmother had abused and neglected the children, citing evidence of her excessive drinking, drug use, lack of supervision, inappropriate discipline, and instability. The court also noted Grandmother's failure to take responsibility for her actions. The court directed the Multidisciplinary Treatment Team (MDT) to discuss an improvement period for visitation purposes only, as it could not envision a scenario where the children would be returned to Grandmother's custody.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case and affirmed the circuit court's rulings. The court found that Grandmother was not entitled to relief based on procedural delays, as she did not seek extraordinary relief through a petition for writ of mandamus. The court also upheld the circuit court's adjudication of Grandmother as abusing and neglectful, finding no clear error in the circuit court's findings. Additionally, the court found that consideration of Grandmother's status as a psychological parent was premature at the adjudicatory phase and that the current visitation arrangement served the best interests of the children. Finally, the court determined that any discussion of dispositional decisions was premature, given the procedural posture of the case. View "In re B.L.-1, B.L.-2, K.L., M.L., and M.S." on Justia Law

A Monongalia County deputy sheriff responded to a domestic dispute involving John D. Stewart, Jr., who suffered from mental illness. The deputy, after advising against backup, pursued Mr. Stewart, who allegedly threatened with a knife. The deputy shot Mr. Stewart, fatally wounding him. Amanda F. Stewart, Mr. Stewart’s daughter, filed a wrongful death action against the Monongalia County Commission and the deputy, alleging excessive force and negligence.The Circuit Court of Monongalia County dismissed claims against the Commission for direct liability but allowed claims for vicarious liability and against the deputy to proceed. The court also denied the motion to dismiss the demand for punitive damages, stating it was premature.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case. It affirmed the lower court’s decision to deny the motion to dismiss the vicarious liability claim against the Commission, finding the Commission is not immune from vicarious liability for the deputy’s negligence. The court also affirmed the denial of the motion to dismiss the negligence claim against the deputy, as the complaint sufficiently alleged facts to suggest the deputy acted with malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner.However, the court reversed the lower court’s decision regarding punitive damages. It held that the Tort Claims Act prohibits punitive damages against the Commission and the deputy, as the deputy was sued in his official capacity. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Monongalia County Commission A/K/A Monongalia County Sheriff's Department and John Doe Deputy v. Amanda F. Stewart, Individually and/or as Administrator of the Estate of John D. Stewart, Jr." on Justia Law

M.D., a high school soccer player, sought a waiver from the West Virginia Secondary School Activities Commission (WVSSAC) to play for both her high school and club soccer teams during the same season. The WVSSAC denied her request, leading M.D. and her parents to file a lawsuit seeking a preliminary injunction to prevent the enforcement of the WVSSAC's Non-school Participation Rule, which prohibited participation in non-school teams during the school season for team sports but not for individual sports.The Circuit Court of Ohio County granted M.D. a preliminary injunction, allowing her to play for both teams. Subsequently, the court granted her summary judgment and a permanent injunction, ruling that the Non-school Participation Rule was arbitrary and capricious because it unfairly differentiated between team and individual sports without a rational basis.The WVSSAC appealed the circuit court's decision. While the appeal was pending, the WVSSAC's Board of Control amended the Non-school Participation Rule to eliminate the distinction between team and individual sports, applying the same restrictions to all student athletes regardless of the type of sport.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case and determined that the amendments to the Non-school Participation Rule rendered the appeal moot. The court found that the substantive changes to the rule addressed the issues raised by M.D., and there were no sufficient collateral consequences or issues of great public interest that warranted further review. Consequently, the court dismissed the appeal as moot. View "West Virginia Secondary School Activities Commission v. David D. and Elizabeth D., Parents and Legal Guardians of M.D." on Justia Law

The petitioner was convicted in the Circuit Court of Barbour County, West Virginia, of multiple counts of sexual assault, sexual abuse, and displaying obscene material to a minor. The charges stemmed from disclosures made by an eight-year-old girl, C.M., who described being sexually assaulted by the petitioner, her mother's boyfriend. The petitioner was sentenced to an effective term of 115 to 375 years in prison.The trial was initially set for January 2020 but was continued multiple times, with the final trial date set for July 2021. The petitioner moved for a continuance to investigate new disclosures by C.M. and to conduct a psychological evaluation of her, which the court denied. During the trial, the court admitted evidence of the petitioner’s internet search history for child pornography under Rule 404(b) without giving a limiting instruction to the jury. The jury convicted the petitioner on all counts.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case. The court found that the Rule 404(b) evidence was properly admitted after thorough consideration and that the failure to give a limiting instruction was not plain error. The court also held that the denial of the continuance for a psychological evaluation was not an abuse of discretion, as the petitioner failed to show a compelling need for it. The court declined to address the petitioner’s claims regarding the jury questions and due process violations due to the lack of a complete record and suggested these issues could be developed in post-conviction proceedings.The court affirmed the petitioner’s convictions, finding no reversible error in the trial court’s decisions. View "State of West Virginia v. Keith Jason Walker" on Justia Law